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MARGINS: ESTIMATING THE
INFLUENCE OF THE BIG THREE
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

ON

Caleb N. Griffin*

ABSTRACT
This Article contributes to the growing literature on the influence of index funds on corporate governance by providing new data on index funds’
ownership, voting control, and impact on shareholder proposal outcomes.
The Article first presents data on the firm ownership and voting control of
the three largest index funds (the Big Three) at Fortune 250 companies. It
finds that the Big Three combined are the largest shareholder in 96% of
Fortune 250 companies, that Vanguard and BlackRock combined (the Big
Two) are the largest shareholder in 94.4% of such companies, and that
Vanguard alone (the Big One) is the largest shareholder in 65.6% of such
companies.
The Article next analyzes the power of the Big Three index funds to
decide the outcome of shareholder proposals. It presents data on the voting
margins for all shareholder proposals at Fortune 250 companies in calendar years 2018 and 2019. It then pairs the voting-margin data with the voting-control data to provide a market-wide picture of which shareholder
proposals are likely within the Big Three’s influence. The findings suggest
that the Big Three already possess sufficient voting power to determine the
outcome of a majority of shareholder proposals.
Additionally, the Article provides data on the Big Three’s influence over
specific categories of shareholder proposals. It finds that the Big Three
have the power to determine approximately 50% of the environmental and
social proposals (with low error rates) and approximately 65% of governance proposals (with somewhat higher error rates). In light of these findings, the Article explores the profound implications of this proxy voting
power and proposes methods for investors to reclaim their autonomy.
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I. INTRODUCTION

I

NDEXED investing has exploded in popularity over the past two decades. In August 2019, U.S. equity index fund assets officially surpassed their actively managed counterparts for the first time,
reaching $4.27 trillion in total assets under management.1 This achievement, and the underlying growth in indexed investing, represents one of
the most important power transfers in the history of capital markets.
Just three index fund providers—Vanguard, BlackRock, and State
Street (collectively, the Big Three)—control the vast majority of indexed
capital. Because of the legal structure of index funds, the Big Three have
the right to vote the shares purchased with their investors’ money, subject
only to minimal constraints.2 Thus, the Big Three are not just managers of
an enormous amount of capital but are stewards responsible for making
pivotal decisions for the companies in which that capital is invested.
Given their voting influence, the concentration of power in the hands of
the Big Three has become a source of concern for academics and policymakers. In particular, experts fear that these agents have or will soon
obtain undue power over corporate governance3 and that they may have
insufficient or improper incentives for promoting good governance
practices.4

1. Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kings-of-wall-street-1156879
9004 [https://perma.cc/9KPD-U345].
2. See generally Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by
Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Disclosure of Proxy Voting].
3. See, e.g., Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds,
Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298,
316–17 (2017) (finding that the Big Three’s rise in power represents unprecedented levels
of concentrated corporate ownership); Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposal to Limit the AntiCompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 676 (2017) (warning
of anti-competitive effects from passive ownership); John C. Coates IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 2–3 (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion
Paper Series, Paper No. 1001, 2019), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Coates_1001.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM5F-PQDS] (warning of the threat of concentrated decision-making associated with the rise of passive investment).
4. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza et al., Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund Activism and the
New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (describing
index funds as having improper incentives to use their power to attract new clients rather
than to promote the interests of existing clients); Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index
Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 2029, 2050–72 (2019) (arguing that index funds possess insufficient incentives to
engage in beneficial corporate governance practices and that they have improper incentives to be overly deferential to management); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncer-
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One realm of index funds’ voting influence that may be particularly
salient for shareholders is shareholder proposals. While other ballot items
tend to be routine, and therefore relatively uncontroversial, shareholder
proposals tend to be far more divisive. Moreover, these proposals often
touch on quasi-political topics such as climate change, gender pay disparities, diversity, corporate lobbying, and pollution. It is unlikely that the
large and diverse pool of individuals who constitute the Big Three’s investors are of one mind about such topics. Given the controversial nature
and important role of such proposals in the shareholder franchise, this
Article asks the question: what impact do the Big Three have on shareholder proposals?
To begin to answer this question, this Article examines the influence of
the largest index fund managers on shareholder proposals at the 250 largest publicly traded companies in the United States. This Article demonstrates that the Big Three combined serve as the largest shareholder at
96% of the largest 250 publicly traded companies in the United States,
that Vanguard and BlackRock combined (the Big Two) serve as the largest shareholder at 94.4% of such companies, and that Vanguard alone
(the Big One) is the single largest shareholder at 65.6% of such companies.5 Additionally, it finds that, on average, the Big Three control 20.1%
of shares at these companies, and it estimates that the Big Three cast a
combined 25% of the proxy votes, on average, at these companies.6 It
further estimates Vanguard’s average voting influence as 10.6%, BlackRock’s as 9.0%, and State Street’s as 4.4%.7
Utilizing this data on the Big Three’s sphere of influence at the 250
largest companies, this Article examines the margins of the 511 shareholder proposals at issue at these companies in calendar years 2018 and
2019.8 It finds that nearly one-fifth of such proposals have margins of less
than 10.6%, potentially placing these proposals within Vanguard’s sole
decision-making power. It further finds that over four-tenths of such proposals have margins of less than 19.6%, meaning that these proposals
may be determined by just Vanguard and BlackRock, which tend to vote
near-identically in opposition to the vast majority of shareholder proposals. Finally, over one-half of such proposals are decided by margins of less
than 25%, making them vulnerable to the combined actions of the Big
Three. Overall, the data suggest that individually, the Big Three already
have the potential to determine a significant proportion of proxy votes,
and that combined, they possess the power to decide the outcome of a
majority of shareholder proposals.
tain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 473–74 (1991)
(arguing that index fund managers have few incentives to act in the best interests of their
principals with regard to corporate governance).
5. See infra Table 2.
6. See infra Table 1.
7. Id.
8. PROXY MONITOR, https://www.proxymonitor.org [https://perma.cc/V3RR-XXFL]
(database tracking shareholder proposals for the Fortune 250 companies).
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Nearly all shareholder proposals are “precatory,” or nonbinding.9 Such
proposals derive their power from the fact that directors have fiduciary
duties to act in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
When shareholders collectively express a strong preference for a given
action or policy, this constitutes strong evidence of what they consider to
be their best interests. As such, this Article uses majority support as its
benchmark for assessing the margins on shareholder proposals. In practice, even if a shareholder proposal fails to win majority support, significant minority support often causes the board to implement the proposal
despite the failed vote.10 Because of this fact, support for shareholder
proposals from the Big Three becomes even more important, given that
the trio may constitute a “significant minority” of shares without any additional support. This Article may thus understate the impact of the Big
Three’s voting behavior in terms of whether their behavior results in implementation of a given proposal.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly explores the rise of the
Big Three’s power and the ways that the Big Three influence corporate
decision-making. Part III provides data on the Big Three’s influence at
the 250 largest publicly traded companies in the U.S. (the Fortune 250),
including the Big Three’s voting influence and the percentage of companies at which the Big Three serve as the single largest shareholder, individually or collectively. Part IV provides data on the margins for all
shareholder proposals at Fortune 250 companies for calendar years 2018
and 2019. Part V argues that the Big Three’s current power to influence
shareholder proposals underscores the need for action to constrain index
funds’ power and to align that power with investors’ interests and preferences. Part VI sets forth this Article’s conclusions.
II. THE RISE OF THE BIG THREE
Passive investment funds feature as a defining characteristic the goal of
replicating the performance of an existing market index11 instead of attempting to select certain stocks believed to outperform the market (an
orientation that characterizes “active funds”).12 Passive investment funds
include both index funds, which trade once daily after the close of markets,13 and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), which trade continuously
9. Keith F. Higgins, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Rule 14a-8: Conflicting Proposals, Conflicting Views (Feb. 10, 2015), www.sec.
gov/news/speech/rule-14a-8-conflicting-proposals-conflicting-views.html [https://perma.cc/
AD9R-GXBE].
10. See Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of Private
Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 420–22 (2018).
11. Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493,
506 (2018).
12. Jeffrey M. Colon, The Great ETF Tax Swindle: The Taxation of In-Kind Redemptions, 122 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017).
13. William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: A
Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69, 72
(2008).
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throughout the day.14 Although the difference in trading behavior has
important effects in some contexts, for the purposes of this Article index
funds and ETFs will be referred to collectively by the terms “passive
funds” and “index funds.”
When index funds first emerged in the mid-1970s, Wall Street largely
rejected the notion that the market as a whole could outperform selections of promising stocks handpicked by experts.15 The Leuthold Group,
a research firm, circulated posters with the slogans “INDEX FUNDS
ARE UNAMERICAN!” and “Help Stamp Out Index Funds.”16 Other
critics referred to index funds as “a sure path to mediocrity” and “Bogle’s
Folly.”17
However, the passive nature of passive investing has a key advantage
in that it entails relatively minimal costs in the form of research, employee salaries, and stock selection. Index funds can pass on these cost
savings to consumers in the form of low fees.18 These low fees––in combination with the inability of most active fund managers to consistently beat
the market––has meant that passive funds have generally outperformed
their actively managed counterparts.19 Indeed, just 23% of active funds
surpassed their passive rivals over the ten-year period from June 2009 to
June 2019.20
Over time, the financial success of index funds has drawn attention
from commentators, financial advisors, academics, and ultimately, consumers, fueling the growth of these funds. That growth has been dramatic: index funds controlled just 4% of the equity mutual fund market in

14. Id.
15. Ben Steverman, The Index Fund Turns 40—And Gets Its Revenge, NASDAQ
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/the-index-fund-turns-40-and-gets-its-re
venge-cm673349 [https://perma.cc/H5AH-HMAF].
16. Id.
17. Jack Bogle: The Man Who Pioneered Index Investing, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-46906246 [https://perma.cc/UD3L-2RFW].
18. The asset-weighted average expense ratio for active mutual funds was 0.67% in
2018 compared with 0.15% for passive mutual funds. MORNINGSTAR, ANNUAL U.S. FUND
FEE STUDY 1 (2018), https://www.morningstar.com/lp/annual-us-fund-fee-study [https://
perma.cc/WLH7-YLG5]. But see Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Protecting Consumer Investors
by Facilitating “Improved Performance” Competition, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015)
(noting that some index funds charge supracompetitive fees for their products).
19. Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual
Funds, 52 J. FIN. 783, 787 (1996) (finding that actively managed funds underperformed
related indices by sixty-five basis points); Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance: An
Empirical Decomposition into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses, 55 J. FIN. 1655, 1690 (2000) (finding that actively managed funds underperform
indices by 1%); AYE M. SOE ET AL., SPIVA U.S. YEAR-END 2018 SCORECARD, S&P DOW
JONES INDICES 1 (2019), https://www.spglobal.com/_assets/documents/corporate/us-spivareport-11-march-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LF7-2FDY] (finding that the S&P 500 index
outperforms active managers for the ninth consecutive year).
20. Ben Johnson, Active Funds vs. Passive Funds: Which Fund Types Had Increased
Success Rates?, MORNINGSTAR (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.morningstar.com/insights/
2019/09/20/active-vs-passive [https://perma.cc/4Q3Z-DKPH].
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1995,21 but they controlled 34% in 201522 and over 50% in 2019.23 Over
the past decade, average inflows to index funds were eighteen times
larger than the inflows to actively managed funds.24 Index funds now own
approximately one-fifth of Standard and Poor’s index of the 500 largest
publicly-traded companies in the U.S. (S&P 500), and they cast more
than one-fourth of the votes at S&P 500 companies.25
The growth of index investing has been not only incredibly rapid but
also highly concentrated. The bulk of index fund capital is in the hands of
the Big Three triopoly of Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street. The Big
Three together hold 81% of index fund assets.26 Competitors struggle to
compete against these behemoths, given their extraordinary economies of
scale that facilitate low fees and enable the funds to undercut a competitor’s prices or mimic competitors’ innovative products.27 Given these
facts, the dominance of the Big Three is unlikely to subside.28
The Big Three’s extreme and concentrated growth entails a number of
important consequences for financial markets and the overall economy.
In the realm of corporate governance, one feature is key: the ability of
these funds to vote on behalf of their investors. The Big Three have not
only a legal right to vote shares associated with their voluminous holdings29 but also arguably a fiduciary duty to do so.30 As such, these three
index fund managers have developed infrastructure to engage in voting
and other stewardship activities. These stewardship activities are generally performed by small teams of index fund employees, known as stewardship teams, which are charged with the responsibility of undertaking
stewardship activities on behalf of the index fund.31
21. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV.
721, 727–28 (2019).
22. Id.
23. Lim, supra note 1.
24. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 21, at 727–28.
25. Id.
26. John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-index-funds-1543504551
[https://perma.cc/YUE8-MT5B].
27. Coates, supra note 3, at 13.
28. Id.
29. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 21, at 727–28.
30. Interpretive Bulletin on Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of
Investment Policy, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01 (2019) (“The fiduciary act of managing plan
assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of proxies appurtenant to those
shares of stock.”).While this technically applies only to securities held in employee benefit
plan investment portfolios, it has affected proxy voting policy in other contexts as well. See
Jill E. Fisch, The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 106 (Dionysia
Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., Cambridge Univ. Press forthcoming) (“U.S. regulators have not adopted a formal requirement of investor stewardship. Certain components
of what might be deemed a stewardship function are implicit, however, in other legal requirements that apply to institutional investors.”).
31. BlackRock Investment Stewardship, BLACKROCK 19 (2020), https://www.black
rock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-profile-of-blackrock-investment-stewardship-team-work.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBD6-43HZ] (describing the activities of the BlackRock’s stewardship team, including performing “approximately 2,500 engagements
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The activities of stewardship teams are tripartite in form. First, stewardship teams engage in priority-setting activities.32 Priority setting by itself can influence management to act preemptively in line with the
stewardship teams’ priorities.33 Such priority setting can encourage management to act preemptively, effectively sidestepping the need for public
conflict in the proxy voting arena.
Second, stewardship teams engage in direct communications with management at thousands of companies annually, whether through letters,
over the phone, or via in-person discussions.34 In these communications,
referred to as engagements, stewardship teams encourage management to
adopt or abandon particular behaviors or traits.35 Engagements occur at a
sizable number of companies each year: Vanguard engaged with 868 companies in 2018, representing 59% of its assets under management;36
BlackRock engaged with nearly 1,500 companies in 2018, representing
50.4% of its assets under management;37 and State Street engaged with
1,533 companies, representing 70% of the firm’s assets under management in equities.38 Because of their substantial holdings and corresponding voting influence, the Big Three have the power to sway management
in their preferred direction through these conversations without the need
to resort to proxy voting.
annually, and undertak[ing] this activity on behalf of clients as a fiduciary regardless of
investment vehicle or strategy type,” and exercising “BlackRock’s voting rights consistent
with our firm’s published voting guidelines”); VANGUARD, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP
2019 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2019), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-commentary/2019_investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/233U-EF7W] [hereinafter VANGUARD 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT]
(“Our team represents Vanguard fund shareholders’ interests through industry advocacy,
company engagement, and proxy voting.”); STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, STEWARDSHIP REPORT 2018–19, at 22 (2019), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social- governance/2019/09/annual-asset-stewardship-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
735W-XL64] [hereinafter STATE STREET 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT] (“All
voting and engagement activities are centralized within our Stewardship Team, irrespective
of investment strategy or geographic region.”); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The
Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERS. 89, 95 (2017) (“[T]he voting
and stewardship decisions of mutual fund families are commonly concentrated in a single
corporate governance department or proxy voting department of the investment manager . . . .”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126
YALE L.J. 1870, 1915 (2017) (“[T]he fund family will, at best, establish a centralized voting
unit comprised of comparatively less expensive employees, who will develop voting policies and make sure government mandates for voting are satisfied.”).
32. See, e.g., STATE STREET 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT, supra note 31,
at 22.
33. Coates, supra note 3, at 16.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. VANGUARD 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT, supra note 31, at 8.
37. BLACKROCK, BLACKROCK 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ANNUAL REPORT 4
(2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-steward
ship-report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EXX-PSPC] [hereinafter BLACKROCK 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT].
38. STATE STREET 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT, supra note 31, at 13.
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Third, stewardship teams are responsible for casting votes in shareholder elections. The law vests index funds with the legal authority and
responsibility to engage in the proxy voting process in a manner consistent with the best interests of their investors.39 Although not explicitly
required by law, index funds have acted as if they are required to vote
substantially all of the shares under their control since 2003, when the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued guidance on the nature of their voting obligations.40 Given the expansive nature of index
fund holdings, stewardship teams at the Big Three consider a great number of ballot items each year: Vanguard voted on nearly 170,000 individual proposals in the 2019 proxy year,41 BlackRock voted on just over
155,000 ballot items,42 and State Street voted on roughly 160,000 topics.43
As outlined below, the Big Three’s proxy voting power gives them substantial influence over American corporate governance, given the large
size of their holdings and the relatively narrow margins on many ballot
items.
Even where the Big Three’s votes are not sufficient to determine the
outcome of the proxy vote outright, their votes may still influence corporate policies and procedures. First, for the reasons discussed above, even
substantial minority support for a shareholder proposal may prompt the
board to act on the issue in question.44 Second, rates of support also determine whether or not a given proposal may be resubmitted for consideration at a subsequent shareholder meeting. Under current rules, a
company may exclude a shareholder proposal that “deals with substantially the same subject matter as another proposal or proposals that has
or have been previously included in the company’s proxy materials within
the preceding 5 calendar years” if the matter was voted on at least once in
the last three calendar years and received less than 3% of the vote if
previously voted on once, 6% of the vote if previously voted on twice, or
10% of the vote if previously voted on three or more times.45 The SEC
has proposed changes to these thresholds, under which a proposal could
be excluded if the most recent vote occurred within the preceding three
calendar years and did not receive at least 5% of the votes cast if previously voted on once, 15% of the votes cast if previously voted on twice,
and 25% of the votes cast if previously voted on three or more times.46
Under either rule, the Big Three’s control of a substantial proportion of
votes cast means that the trio has the power to determine whether or not
a proposal may be reconsidered in future years.
39. See generally Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 2.
40. Jill Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 44 (2019).
41. VANGUARD 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT, supra note 31, at 7.
42. BLACKROCK 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT, supra note 37, at 4.
43. STATE STREET 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT, supra note 31, at 28.
44. Ho, supra note 10, at 420–22.
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(12) (2020).
46. Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange Act
Rule 14a-8, 84 Fed. Reg. 66458 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019).
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Collectively, these three forms of stewardship give the Big Three unprecedented influence over public companies. Although all are key pathways by which these funds exert their influence, this Article focuses on
the formal proxy voting process. The reasons for this are twofold: First,
the proxy voting process is, despite considerable room for improvement,
the most transparent of the three channels of influence. The thought
processes and internal decision-making that occur when executives react
to the stated priorities of the Big Three are naturally opaque, and the
contents of the Big Three’s informal engagements with executives at various companies are generally kept from the public eye. Thus, studying
their proxy voting behavior offers us a clear picture of at least one facet
of the Big Three’s influence. Second, and more fundamentally, the proxy
voting process is the driver of index funds’ power in other areas. The Big
Three’s priority-setting activities and engagements are successful in large
part because the Big Three possess significant voting power. Without
such voting power, management could afford to ignore the Big Three’s
priorities and requests for action. With that in mind, this Article assesses
the current power of index funds to shape corporate behavior along two
axes. First, it considers the size of index funds’ holdings and their corresponding voting power. Second, it considers the margins for shareholder
proposals at the largest publicly traded companies. It compares these two
figures to determine the potential extent of index fund power over proxy
votes and, relatedly, whether the implicit threat of an antagonistic proxy
vote is likely to influence management to act preemptively or responsively to engagement efforts by the Big Three.
III. DATA ON THE BIG THREE’S INFLUENCE
One dimension of the Big Three’s influence over corporate governance
is its ownership of a significant proportion of shares of the largest publicly
traded companies in the United States. Prior research has established that
the Big Three combined own an average of 20.5% of outstanding shares
for S&P 500 companies, with Vanguard owning 8.8%, BlackRock owning
7.1%, and State Street owning 4.6% of such shares.47 Similarly, previous
research suggested that the Big Three combined own an average of
16.5% of outstanding shares for Russell 3000 companies, with Vanguard
owning 6.6%, BlackRock owning 7.3%, and State Street owning 2.6% of
such shares.48 This Article provides new data on the Big Three’s ownership of the 250 largest publicly traded companies in the United States,
and it finds that the combined mean ownership stake of the Big Three is
20.1%, with Vanguard owning 8.4%, BlackRock owning 7.3%, and State
Street owning 4.4% of such shares, figures consistent with prior findings.
47. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 21, at 736; see also David McLaughlin & Annie
Massa, The Hidden Dangers of the Great Index Fund Takeover, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-01-09/the-hidden-dangers-of-the-great-index-fund-takeover [https://perma.cc/67Q6-C75R] (finding that the Big Three own 22% of
the shares of the typical S&P 500 company).
48. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 21, at 736.
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TABLE 1: BIG THREE OWNERSHIP SHARES
LARGEST 250 COMPANIES

AT

This Table reports the mean and median ownership rates49 for the Big
Three individually and combined at the largest 250 publicly traded companies50 in the United States. It also provides an estimate of the mean and
median percentage of votes cast by each index fund company.
Category
Mean Percentage of
Outstanding Shares
Median Percentage of
Outstanding Shares
Estimated Mean
Percentage of Votes Cast51
Estimated Median
Percentage of Votes Cast52

Vanguard BlackRock

State
Street

Combined

8.4%

7.3%

4.4%

20.1%

8.2%

7.1%

4.3%

19.6%

10.6%

9.0%

5.4%

25.0%

10.1%

8.7%

5.4%

24.2%

One of the key rights associated with share ownership is, of course, the
right to engage in the proxy voting process with respect to those shares.
However, while a significant number of shareholders do not vote their
shares in annual elections,53 the Big Three tend to vote all of their
shares.54 Because of these phenomena, the proportion of votes cast by
the Big Three is greater than their ownership interest. For S&P 500 companies, prior research indicated that Vanguard’s mean voting share was
26% greater than its mean ownership share, BlackRock’s mean voting
share was 23% greater than its mean ownership share, State Street’s
mean voting share was 22% greater than its mean ownership share, and
the Big Three’s combined mean voting share was 24% greater than its
49. Table 1 is based on percentage of outstanding-share ownership data from
Morningstar Investment Research Center accessed on February 23, 2020. MORNINGSTAR
INV. RES. CTR., https://library.morningstar.com/ [https://perma.cc/H9RH-X7LB].
50. The companies included in this data set are the 250 largest publicly traded companies as ranked by Fortune in 2019. Fortune 500, FORTUNE (2019), https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/ [https://perma.cc/833F-3UKB].
51. Based upon data demonstrating that the Big Three cast 22% to 38% more votes
than their mean ownership shares, this Article estimates the Big Three’s voting influence in
the 250 largest companies as 23% greater than its ownership share. See Bebchuk & Hirst,
supra note 21, at 736.
52. Based upon data demonstrating that the Big Three cast 23% to 35% more votes
than their median ownership shares, this Article estimates the Big Three’s median voting
influence in the 250 largest companies as 23% greater than its median ownership share. See
id.
53. See, e.g., Broadridge & PwC, 2019 Proxy Season Review, PROXYPULSE 5 (2019),
https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-proxypulse-2019-review.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3YL5-REG7] (finding that only 28% of shares held by individual investors were
voted at annual meetings in 2019).
54. Fisch et al., supra note 40, at 44.
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mean ownership share.55 Similarly, Vanguard’s median voting share at
S&P 500 companies was 23% greater than its median ownership share,
BlackRock’s median voting share was 23% greater than its median ownership share, State Street’s median voting share was 25% greater than its
median ownership share, and the Big Three’s combined median voting
share was 24% greater than its median ownership share.56 Based upon
these rates, this Article estimates that Vanguard alone casts a mean of
10.6% of votes, BlackRock casts a mean of 9.0% of votes, and State
Street casts a mean of 5.4% of votes at the largest 250 publicly traded
companies in the United States, for a combined total of 25%. Similarly, it
estimates Vanguard’s median voting influence as 10.1%, BlackRock’s median voting influence as 8.7%, and State Street’s median voting influence
as 5.4%, for a combined total of 24.2%. Such findings are consistent with
prior research in this area.
Another dimension of the Big Three’s influence over corporate governance comes from their status as large shareholders, which can provide
these funds the ability to access and influence management through informal channels. Previous research from 2017 found that the Big Three,
taken together, constituted the single largest shareholder at 88% of S&P
500 firms.57 Table 2 reveals that, as of February 2020, the Big Three taken
together constitute the single largest shareholder at 96% of the largest
250 publicly traded companies. What is more, just one of the trio alone is
the single largest shareholder at 78% of such companies, with Vanguard
serving as the single largest shareholder at a staggering 65.6% of such
companies, BlackRock serving as the single largest shareholder at an additional 10.8% of such companies, and State Street serving as the single
largest shareholder at 1.6% of such companies. Such findings demonstrate that Vanguard alone is the largest shareholder at the majority of
the largest publicly traded companies in the United States and that, at a
supermajority of such companies, one of the Big Three is the single largest shareholder.

55. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 21, at 736; see also McLaughlin & Massa, supra note
47.
56. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 21, at 736.
57. Fichtner et al., supra note 3, at 313.
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LARGEST 250 COMPANIES

This Table reports the number and percentage of the 250 largest companies58 at which the Big Three serve as the single largest shareholder, taken
either singly (first four columns) or in combination (final two columns).59
Category
Number
Percentage

Vanguard BlackRock
164
65.6%

27
10.8 %

One
Big Three
State
of Big Big Two
Combined
Street
Three
4
195
236
240
1.6% 78% 94.4%
96%

As these findings reveal, the Big Three have substantial holdings, powerful voting capabilities, and an influential position as the single largest
shareholder at most of the 250 largest publicly traded companies in the
United States. Many commentators have discussed what will occur if and
when the Big Three’s holdings and corresponding influence grow. However, an important question is relatively under-discussed: what can the
Big Three do with their influence right now? This Article thus turns to an
analysis of the present influence of the Big Three.
IV. DATA ON MARGINS FOR 2018–2019 VOTES
The Big Three own a combined mean of 20.1% of the 250 largest publicly traded companies, and they cast approximately 25% of the votes at
such companies.60 However, the impact that the Big Three have on elections at portfolio companies is a function not only of their voting power
but also of the margins for the ballot items under consideration. In relatively uncontroversial outcomes (with greater than 25% margins), the Big
Three will generally not be able to control the outcome, even acting in
concert.61 In elections with margins within 25%, the Big Three acting together will often have the power to determine the outcome. In elections
with margins within 19.6%, the Big Two (Vanguard and BlackRock) will
often have the power to determine the outcome. In elections with margins within 10.6%, Vanguard alone, the Big One, will often have the
power to determine the outcome on its own.
Where do the margins in corporate elections currently fall? This Part
seeks to answer that question. It provides data on the voting margins for
58. The companies included in this data set are the 250 largest publicly traded companies as ranked by Fortune in 2019. Fortune 500, supra note 50.
59. Table 1 is based on percentage of outstanding-share ownership data from
Morningstar Investment Research Center accessed on February 23, 2020. MORNINGSTAR
INV. RES. CTR., supra note 49.
60. See supra Table 1.
61. The Big Three may still be able to influence outcomes in other ways outside the
formal voting context, such as through engagements. Moreover, the Big Three have substantial reputational power, and the knowledge that one or more of the Big Three is voting
a certain way may influence other investors, potentially increasing their influence on formal voting above the 25% of votes nominally under their control.
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all 511 shareholder proposals at issue at Fortune 250 companies in calendar years 2018 and 2019. It breaks shareholder proposals into three broad
categories: environmental proposals, social proposals, and governance
proposals. Section IV.A provides data on the margins for environmental
proposals, including proposals related to general environmental reporting, climate change, pollution reporting, water stewardship, pesticide reporting, and deforestation. Section IV.B provides data on the margins for
social proposals, including proposals related to equality and diversity, political transparency, worker welfare, human rights, privacy and content
governance, and other social proposals. Section IV.C provides data on
the margins for governance proposals, including proposals related to executive compensation, voting policies, and other governance proposals.
Section IV.D provides data on overall margins for all shareholder
proposals.
This Part assesses the maximum current impact of the Big Three
through formal proxy voting channels. It generally assumes that, as expected given their influence, the Big Three vote on the winning side of a
given shareholder proposal. However, in the less common instances when
Big Three funds voted with the losing side, the tables below may overstate the influence that the Big Three exert through formal proxy voting,
although not through other channels. Consequently, the figures in these
tables should be interpreted conservatively as the upper bound of the Big
Three’s current proxy voting power. However, knowledge of the Big
Three’s respective voting histories suggests a low error rate. Data on fund
voting behavior and shareholder proposal passage rates allows estimation
of maximum error rates. For instance, Vanguard and BlackRock supported environmental and social (E&S) proposals at rates of 7.5% and
7.1%, respectively; this caps the theoretical maximum rate of “false positives” (i.e., voting for a proposal that does not pass) at 7.5% and 7.1% for
E&S proposals at these funds.62 Conversely, given that approximately
2.4% of E&S proposals passed in the 2018–2019 period,63 this caps the
theoretical maximum rate of “false negatives” (i.e., voting against a proposal that passes) for E&S proposals at approximately 2.4%. Given that
the considerable influence of these funds means, ceteris paribus, they are
far more likely to vote for the winning side than the losing side, the real
error rates are likely well below the theoretical maxima. More detailed,
fund-specific information is discussed for each subtopic below. Ultimately, the tables that follow are not designed to argue that the members
62. Caleb N. Griffin, Environmental & Social Voting at Index Funds 25–26 (Feb. 14,
2020) (working paper) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3542081). State Street
supported 22.7% of such proposals, capping its maximum error rate at that level. Id. Thus,
although State Street is by far the smallest of the big three and the least likely to flip voting
outcomes, the data for State Street should be interpreted particularly conservatively.
63. Marc Treviño, 2019 Proxy Season Review: Part 1—Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 26, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard
.edu/2019/07/26/2019-proxy-season-review-part-1-rule-14a-8-shareholder-proposals/ [https:/
/perma.cc/CKK2-GCN2] (stating that, as of the publication date, 17 out of 710 such proposals had passed).
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of the Big Three could have (or did) flip the outcome of any particular
proxy vote. Rather, they are designed to provide a market-wide picture of
the Big Three’s power and to assess the trio’s potential influence on different categories of shareholder proposals at the present moment and
into the future.
A. ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSALS
Shareholders are increasingly exercising their right to present corporate boards with recommendations (known as shareholder proposals)
that seek to advance certain environmental causes and outcomes.64 In
calendar years 2018 and 2019, shareholders at the 250 largest publicly
traded companies considered fifty-seven different shareholder proposals
related to the environment.65 These proposals address a wide variety of
environmental issues and topics, including climate change, environmental
leadership, pollution reporting, water stewardship, sustainability, pesticide reporting, and deforestation.66 Only two environmental proposals at
issue in 2018 and 2019 received greater than 50% support; both sought
increased reporting on the potential portfolio impacts of climate
change.67 As a general matter, the Big Three tend not to support environmental proposals.68 Despite their lack of support for such proposals, a
significant proportion of these proposals were controversial, rather than
overwhelmingly opposed by shareholders. The relatively close margins on
such proposals mean that the Big Three have the power to substantially
increase the number and percentage of passing environmental proposals,
given the Big Three’s significant voting stakes.
As Table 3 reveals, shareholders that cast even a moderate proportion
of votes can already determine the outcome of a significant proportion of
environmental proposals. Well over one-tenth of shareholder proposals
fell within a 10.6% margin, meaning that Vanguard alone is in a position
to influence the fate of a significant portion of environmental proposals.
Proposals that are most susceptible to Vanguard’s influence fall in the
climate change and sustainability categories. Over one-third of environmental proposals fell within a 19.6% margin, meaning that Vanguard and
BlackRock together have the power to determine the outcome of a substantial minority of environmental proposals. Proposals susceptible to
Vanguard and BlackRock’s combined influence generally fall in the climate change, sustainability, water stewardship, pesticide reporting, and
deforestation categories. Finally, just under half of all environmental proposals are decided by margins of 25% or less, meaning that the Big Three
in concert have significant power to influence the outcomes of environ64. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
65. PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Griffin, supra note 62, at 25–26 (showing that Vanguard supported 18.9% of
unique environmental proposals, while State Street supported 20.7% and BlackRock supported 17.1% of such proposals).
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mental proposals, even without any further growth. Once again, the most
controversial and therefore most easily influenced proposals fall in the
climate change, sustainability, water stewardship, pesticide reporting, and
deforestation categories.
TABLE 3: VOTING MARGINS

ON

ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSALS69

This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for environmental shareholder proposals at issue in calendar years
2018 and 2019, as well as the proportion of shareholder proposals that fell
within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25% (Big
Three).
Mean
Big One
Support
0 of 2
General Environmental
2.9%
(0%)
7 of 28
Climate Change
24.9%
(25%)
0 of 3
Environmental Leadership
13.8%
(0%)
0 of 3
Pollution Reporting
10.6%
(0%)
0 of 2
Water Stewardship
24%
(0%)
2 of 14
Sustainability
30.1%
(14.3%)
0 of 3
Pesticide Reporting
18.1%
(0%)
0 of 2
Deforestation
21.3%
(0%)
9 of 57
Overall Environmental
(15.8%)
Category

Big Two Big Three
0 of 2
(0%)
12 of 28
(42.9%)
0 of 3
(0%)
0 of 3
(0%)
1 of 2
(50%)
5 of 14
(35.7%)
1 of 3
(33%)
1 of 2
(50%)
20 of 57
(35.1%)

0 of 2
(0%)
16 of 28
(57.1%)
1 of 3
(33.3%)
0 of 3
(0%)
1 of 2
(50%)
8 of 14
(57.1%)
1 of 3
(33%)
1 of 2
(50%)
28 of 57
(49.1%)

Data on margins for shareholder environmental proposals suggest that
the Big Three are already able to determine the fate of a significant proportion of the environment-related ballot items at issue in a given year.
As such, index funds are already shaping corporate decision-making on
environmental topics, and their influence is strongest in the areas of the
greatest controversy, such as climate change, sustainability, pesticide reporting, deforestation, and water stewardship.
69. Table 3 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor.
PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
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B. SOCIAL PROPOSALS
In addition to environmental proposals, shareholders also present for
voting a substantial number of proposals related to social topics at annual
meetings. In calendar years 2018 and 2019, shareholders at the 250 largest
publicly traded companies considered 155 different shareholder proposals
related to social causes and issues.70 These proposals cover a diverse set
of topics, ranging from sexual harassment to animal welfare to tax practices to lobbying transparency.
As is the case with environmental proposals, the Big Three tend not to
support shareholder proposals related to social issues and causes.71
Among all shareholders, just four of the 155 social proposals at issue in
2018 and 2019 received greater than 50% support. However, a number of
these proposals lost by relatively close margins, meaning that greater support from the Big Three could meaningfully increase the number of victorious proposals. As Table 5 demonstrates, 12.3% of social proposals had
margins of less than 10.6%, 34.2% of social proposals had margins of less
than 19.6%, and 49% of social proposals had margins of 25% or less.
These figures suggest that the Big Three, and particularly Vanguard and
BlackRock, already have considerable power to shape corporate behavior through their voting decisions.

70. Id.
71. Vanguard supported 11.4% of unique diversity & equality proposals, 6.3% of
unique human rights proposals, 0% of unique worker welfare proposals, 0% of unique
privacy and content governance proposals, 0% of unique political transparency proposals,
and 20% of other unique social proposals in the 2018–2019 proxy season. Griffin, supra
note 62, at 25–26. BlackRock supported 2.9% of unique diversity & equality proposals,
6.3% of unique human rights proposals, 0% of unique worker welfare proposals, 0% of
unique privacy and content governance proposals, 4.6% of unique political transparency
proposals, and 20% of unique other social proposals in the 2018–2019 proxy season. Id.
State Street supported 24.1% of unique diversity & equality proposals, 8.3% of unique
human rights proposals, 0% of unique worker welfare proposals, 0% of unique privacy and
content governance proposals, 37.8% of unique political transparency proposals, and
16.7% of unique other social proposals in the 2018–2019 proxy season. Id.
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ALL SOCIAL PROPOSALS72

This Table provides data on the proportion of shareholder proposals
that fell within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25%
(Big Three).
Category
Equality & Diversity
Political Transparency
Worker Welfare
Human Rights
Privacy & Content Governance
Other Social
Overall Social

Big One
3 of 30
(10%)
14 of 74
(18.9%)
0 of 14
(0%)
0 of 13
(0%)
0 of 7
(0%)
2 of 17
(11.8%)
19 of 155
(12.3%)

Big Two
8 of 30
(26.7%)
35 of 74
(47.3%)
5 of 14
(35.7%)
2 of 13
(15.4%)
0 of 7
(0%)
3 of 17
(17.6%)
53 of 155
(34.2%)

Big Three
14 of 30
(46.7%)
49 of 74
(66.2%)
6 of 14
(42.9%)
3 of 13
(23.1%)
1 of 7
(14.3%)
3 of 17
(17.6%)
76 of 155
(49.0%)

The overall data on margins for social proposals mask considerable variation based on the type of proposal under consideration. As such, additional tables provide more data on the margins for specific categories of
social proposals. Table 5 below provides the data on voting margins for
equality and diversity proposals. It reveals that 10% of equality and diversity proposals fell within margins of 10.6% or less, while 26.7% fell
within margins of 19.6% or less, and 46.7% fell within margins of 25% or
less. In particular, proposals concerning employee diversity have considerably closer margins than other proposal types. All seven proposals on
employee diversity fell within 25% margins, 85.7% of such proposals fell
within 19.6% margins, and 42.9% of such proposals fell within 10.6%
margins. Considering that Vanguard and BlackRock very rarely support
employee diversity proposals, it is clear that increased support by these
large index funds could shift the tide on these types of proposals.73

72. Table 4 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor.
PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
73. Griffin, supra note 62, at 18–19 (finding that Vanguard supported 17.9% of unique
employee diversity reporting proposals while BlackRock supported 0% of such proposals).
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EQUALITY & DIVERSITY PROPOSALS74

This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for equality and diversity shareholder proposals at issue in calendar
years 2018 and 2019, as well as the proportion of shareholder proposals
that fell within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25%
(Big Three).
Mean
Big One
Support
0 of 7
Board Diversity
7.6%
(0%)
0 of 16
Gender, Racial and/or
22.3%
(0%)
Ethnicity Pay Gap Reporting
3 of 7
Employee Diversity
34.6%
(42.9%)
3 of 30
Overall Equality & Diversity
(10%)
Category

Big Two Big Three
0 of 7
(0%)
2 of 16
(12.5%)
6 of 7
(85.7%)
8 of 30
(26.7%)

1 of 7
(14.3%)
8 of 16
(50%)
7 of 7
(100%)
14 of 30
(46.7%)

Margins for political transparency proposals tend to be relatively slim.
Nearly one-fifth of such proposals fell within 10.6% margins, nearly onehalf fell within 19.6% margins, and nearly two-thirds fell within 25% margins. Given that Vanguard and BlackRock almost never support political
transparency proposals, their support could mean that nearly half of such
proposals achieve majority support, and Vanguard alone has the power to
ensure that nearly 20% of such proposals have majority support.75 In
practice, this means that Vanguard’s and BlackRock’s decisions not to
support political transparency proposals prevent the passage of many of
these proposals.

74. Table 5 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor.
PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
75. Griffin, supra note 62, at 25–26 (finding that Vanguard supported 0% of unique
political transparency proposals while BlackRock supported 4.6% of such proposals).
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POLITICAL TRANSPARENCY PROPOSALS

This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for political transparency shareholder proposals at issue in calendar
years 2018 and 2019, as well as the proportion of shareholder proposals
that fell within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25%
(Big Three).
Category

Mean
Support

Political Contribution
Disclosure

33.4%

Lobbying Transparency

26.6%

Advisory Vote on
Political Contributions

5.9%

Overall Political Transparency

Big One

Big Two

Big Three

10 of 25
(40%)
4 of 48
(8.3%)
0 of 1
(0%)
14 of 74
(18.9%)

14 of 25
(56%)
21 of 48
(43.8%)
0 of 1
(0%)
35 of 74
(47.3%)

19 of 25
(76%)
30 of 48
(62.5%)
0 of 1
(0%)
49 of 74
(66.2%)

Margins for worker welfare proposals are somewhat wider. None of the
proposals studied had margins less than 10.6%, over one-third had margins of 19.6%, and nearly half had margins of 25% or less. However, because Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street are united in failing to
support almost any worker welfare proposals, the trio has considerable
power to change the fate of such proposals.76 In particular, their support
could mean that proposals seeking increased transparency on forced labor and prison labor in the supply chain, pay equity between CEOs and
other employees, and sexual harassment reporting gain enough support
to pass. In this way, worker welfare proposals are determined in large
part by the decisions of the Big Three’s stewardship teams.

75. Table 6 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor.
PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
76. Griffin, supra note 62, at 25–26 (finding that Vanguard, BlackRock, and State
Street support 0% of worker welfare proposals).
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WORKER WELFARE PROPOSALS77

This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for worker welfare proposals at issue in calendar years 2018 and 2019,
as well as the proportion of shareholder proposals that fell within margins
of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25% (Big Three).
Category

Mean
Support

Forced Labor & Prison
Labor in Supply Chain

22.5%

Sexual Harassment

25.1%

Pay Equity

34.8%

Employment Practices

5.6%

Overall Worker Welfare

Big One

Big Two

Big Three

0 of 7
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 3
(0%)
0 of 14
(0%)

3 of 7
(42.9%)
1 of 2
(50%)
1 of 2
(50%)
0 of 3
(0%)
5 of 14
(35.7%)

4 of 7
(57.1%)
1 of 2
(50%)
1 of 2
(50%)
0 of 3
(0%)
6 of 14
(42.9%)

Human rights proposals generally lose by significant margins. Table 8
below shows that none of the proposals studied fell within 10.6% margins, 15% fell within 19.6% margins, and nearly 25% fell within 25%
margins. However, margins tend to be closer for human rights reporting
proposals, with nearly one-half falling within 25% margins and over onequarter falling within 19.6% margins. Because the Big Three very rarely
support human rights proposals, their lack of support is determinative in
a significant proportion of contests, even given the wide margins on such
proposals.78

77. Table 7 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor.
PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
78. Griffin, supra note 62, at 25–26 (finding that Vanguard and BlackRock both supported 6.3% of unique human rights proposals while State Street supported 8.3% of such
proposals).
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HUMAN RIGHTS PROPOSALS79

This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for human rights proposals at issue in calendar years 2018 and 2019,
as well as the proportion of shareholder proposals that fell within margins
of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25% (Big Three).
Category
Human Rights
Reporting
Human Rights
Leadership

Mean
Support
16.8%
6.7%

Overall Human Rights

Big One

Big Two

Big Three

0 of 7
(0%)
0 of 6
(0%)
0 of 13
(0%)

2 of 7
(28.3%)
0 of 6
(0%)
2 of 13
(15.4%)

3 of 7
(42.9%)
0 of 6
(0%)
3 of 13
(23.1%)

As Table 9 demonstrates, proposals related to privacy and content governance almost never receive a significant percentage of support from
shareholders overall. Although the Big Three almost never support such
proposals,80 because so few other shareholders support them, the Big
Three’s decisions regarding privacy and content governance proposals
tend to have little independent influence on the outcomes of these types
of proposals. However, it is possible that the occasional proposal achieves
enough support that the combined support of the Big Three could tip the
balance.

79. Table 8 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor.
PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
80. Griffin, supra note 62, at 25–26 (finding that Vanguard, BlackRock and State
Street supported 0% of privacy and content governance proposals).
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TABLE 9: VOTING MARGINS ON PRIVACY & CONTENT
GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS81
This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for privacy and content governance proposals at issue in calendar
years 2018 and 2019, as well as the proportion of shareholder proposals
that fell within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25%
(Big Three).
Category

Mean
Support

Privacy-Related

10%

Report on Content
8.9%
Governance
Overall Privacy &
Content Governance

Big One

Big Two

Big Three

0 of 3
(0%)
0 of 4
(0%)
0 of 7
(0%)

0 of 3
(0%)
0 of 4
(0%)
0 of 7
(0%)

1 of 3
(33.3%)
0 of 4
(0%)
1 of 7
(14.3%)

In addition to the aforementioned categories for social proposals,
shareholders considered a number of other types of social proposals in
calendar years 2018 and 2019 that did not fit neatly in the above categories. These include two proposals seeking annual reporting on charitable
contributions, two proposals seeking reporting on tax practices, two proposals seeking reporting on activities in conflict-affected areas of certain
nation-states, two proposals seeking improved animal welfare practices,
one proposal seeking increased transparency on the pricing of consumer
goods, one proposal seeking support for cannabis descheduling, and
seven proposals related to public health initiatives. These proposals (with
the exception of public health proposals) tended to receive little support
from shareholders. Over one-quarter of public health proposals had margins within 10.6%, while nearly one-half had margins within 19.6%.
Given that Vanguard and BlackRock rarely support such proposals, increased support by these funds could be pivotal for public health
proposals.82

81. Table 9 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor.
PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
82. Griffin, supra note 62, at 23 (finding that Vanguard supported 14.3% of public
health proposals, BlackRock supported 22.2% of public health proposals, and State Street
supported 25% of public health proposals).
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OTHER SOCIAL PROPOSALS83

This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for other social proposals at issue in calendar years 2018 and 2019, as
well as the proportion of shareholder proposals that fell within margins of
10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25% (Big Three).
Category

Mean
Support

Report on
Charitable Giving

2.1%

Report on Tax Practices

1.8%

Report on Activities
in Conflict Zones

7.5%

Animal Welfare

5%

Pricing
Transparency
Support for Cannabis
Descheduling
Public Health
Overall Other Social

0%
1.6%
24.4%

Big One

Big Two

Big Three

0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
2 of 7
(28.6%)
2 of 17
(11.8%)

0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
3 of 7
(42.9%)
3 of 17
(17.6%)

0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
3 of 7
(42.9%)
3 of 17
(17.6%)

Overall, the Big Three, particularly Vanguard and BlackRock, are already in a position to significantly impact the outcomes of a great proportion of social proposals. Their significant holdings, and the relatively
small margins for a number of controversial proposals, imply that the Big
Three are already in a position to decide numerous corporate controversies. This influence is especially pronounced on proposals related to
equality and diversity, worker welfare, and political transparency, but
their effect can also be seen on public health proposals, human rights
proposals, and some privacy and content governance proposals. It is clear
that the Big Three already have the capacity to determine the outcomes
of a considerable proportion of proxy votes.
C. GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS
Shareholders proposed 299 different proposals related to governance
matters.84 Fifty-two of such proposals addressed topics related to execu83. Table 10 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor.
PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
84. Id.
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tive compensation.85 An additional thirty proposals addressed the
mechanics of voting at annual meetings.86 Further, 217 proposals addressed a variety of other topics, such as the right to act by written consent and the ownership percentage required to call special meetings.87
Overall, almost one-quarter of governance proposals won or lost by margins of less than 10.6%, just over half won or lost by margins of less than
19.6%, and almost two-thirds won or lost by margins of 25%. Because the
Big Three’s voting patterns on governance-related topics are more variable than their (at least for the Big Two) near-uniform opposition to environmental and social proposals, theoretical error rates (although perhaps
not real error rates) are higher.88 Thus, the tables below are not designed
to predict the outcome of a particular proxy vote, but to demonstrate that
the Big Three’s voting decisions have a pivotal impact on the marketwide outcomes of governance proposals.
TABLE 11: VOTING MARGINS

ON

ALL GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS89

This Table provides data on the proportion of shareholder proposals
related to governance that fell within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6%
(Big Two), and 25% (Big Three).
Category
Executive Compensation
Voting Policies & Practices
Other Governance
Overall Governance

Big One
3 of 52
(5.7%)
1 of 30
(3.3%)
68 of 217
(31.3%)
72 of 299
(24.1%)

Big Two
12 of 52
(23.1%)
4 of 30
(13.3%)
135 of 217
(62.2%)
151 of 299
(50.5%)

Big Three
20 of 52
(38.5%)
12 of 30
(40%)
163 of 217
(75.1%)
195 of 299
(65.2%)

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. For instance, Vanguard reports that in 2019, it supported 7% of “environmental/
social” shareholder proposals compared to 42% of “governance-related” proposals, 22%
of “board-related” proposals, and 3% of “compensation-related” proposals. VANGUARD
2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT, supra note 31, at 29. State Street reports that it
supported approximately 27% of “environmental and social related” proposals, approximately 28% of “governance-related” proposals, approximately 5% of “directors-related”
proposals, approximately 62% of “compensation-related” proposals, and approximately
14% of “routine business” shareholder proposals. STATE STREET 2019 INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT, supra note 31, at 10. BlackRock’s investment stewardship report does
not provide category-specific data on support for shareholder proposals. See BlackRock
Investment Stewardship, supra note 31, at 14. Overall, better reporting of aggregated proxy
voting data would considerably enhance transparency in this area.
89. Table 11 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor.
PROXY MONITOR, supra note 8.
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As Table 12 highlights, margins for proposals related to executive compensation were larger than those for governance as a whole. Just 5% of
such proposals were decided by margins of 10.6% or less, nearly onequarter were decided by margins of 19.6% or less, and just over one-third
were decided by margins of 25% or less. However, overall statistics mask
considerable variation based upon the type of proposal. In particular,
proposals related to clawbacks, equity compensation rules, and golden
parachutes had especially narrow margins. Nearly half of all clawback
proposals had margins of less than 10.6%, while over two-thirds had margins of 19.6% or less. Similarly, one-quarter of proposals related to equity
compensation rules had margins less than 19.6%, and half of such proposals had margins less than 25%. In addition, three-quarters of proposals
related to golden parachutes had margins less than 19.6%. In these areas,
the decisions of stewardship teams at the Big Three are of considerable
import.
TABLE 12: VOTING MARGINS ON EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION PROPOSALS90
This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for executive compensation proposals at issue in calendar years 2018
and 2019, as well as the proportion of shareholder proposals that fell
within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25% (Big
Three).
Category
Change Clawback Policy
Equity Compensation
Rules
Report on Executive
Compensation
Consider Pay of All
Employees in Setting
Executive Pay
Require Shareholder
Approval of or Prohibit
Golden Parachutes
Performance Metrics
Requirements

Mean
Big One Big Two
Support
3 of 7
5 of 7
33.1%
(42.9%) (71.4%)
0 of 12
4 of 12
24.1%
(0%)
(25%)
0 of 2
0 of 2
6.8%
(0%)
(0%)

Big Three
5 of 7
(71.4%)
6 of 12
(50%)
0 of 2
(0%)

8.4%

0 of 3
(0%)

0 of 3
(0%)

0 of 3
(0%)

34.1%

0 of 4
(0%)

3 of 4
(75%)

4 of 4
(100%)

0 of 24
(0%)
3 of 52
(5.7%)

0 of 24
(0%)
12 of 52
(23.1%)

5 of 24
(20.8%)
20 of 52
(38.5%)

15.3%

Overall Executive Compensation

90. Table 12 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor. Id.
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As Table 13 highlights, margins on proposals related to voting practices
and procedures were relatively wide. Just one such proposal was decided
by margins of 10.6% or less, four (or 13.3%) were decided by margins of
19.6% or less, and twelve (or 40%) were decided by margins of 25% or
less. Only three of seven categories had margins that suggest these proposals are within the Big Three’s influence: proposals seeking the elimination of a dual-class stock structure, proposals seeking simple majority
voting, and proposals seeking majority voting for the election of directors. One-third of proposals seeking the elimination of the dual-class
structure were within 19.6% margins, while over three-quarters were
within the 25% margin. One-tenth of proposals seeking simple majority
voting were within 10.6% margins, while four-tenths were within 25%
margins. Finally, one of two proposals seeking simple majority voting for
director elections had margins of less than 25%. In these areas, the Big
Three’s substantial holdings give them the power to influence voting
outcomes.
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VOTING-RELATED PROPOSALS91

This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for proposals related to voting policies and procedures at issue in calendar years 2018 and 2019, as well as the proportion of shareholder
proposals that fell within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two),
and 25% (Big Three).
Category

Mean
Support

Executive Pay
Confidential Voting

4.2%

Cumulative Voting

8.9%

Director Tenure Limit

5.4%

Eliminate Dual-Class
Stock Structure

29.8%

Simple Majority Voting

60.5%

Majority Voting for
Director Elections
Eliminate Formula
Swapping

27.4%
6.2%

Overall Voting-Related

Big One

Big Two

Big Three

0 of 1
(0%)
0 of 5
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
0 of 9
(0%)
1 of 10
(10%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
1 of 30
(3.3%)

0 of 1
(0%)
0 of 5
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
3 of 9
(33.3%)
1 of 10
(10%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 2
(0%)
4 of 30
(13.3%)

0 of 1
(0%)
0 of 5
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
7 of 9
(77.8%)
4 of 10
(40%)
1 of 2
(50%)
0 of 2
(0%)
12 of 30
(40%)

As Table 14 demonstrates, margins varied substantially on proposals
related to other governance topics. Proposals related to chairperson independence, declassifying the board, ownership percentages to call special
meetings, and the right to act by written consent had the narrowest margins. In the subset of proposals addressing chairperson independence,
15.2% were within 10.6% margins, over one-half were within 19.6% margins, and nearly three-quarters were within 25% margins. One of the two
proposals on declassifying the board had margins of less than 10.6%,
while the other proposal had margins of less than 25%. Over half of proposals to reduce the threshold to call a special meeting had margins of
less than 10.6%, nearly nine-tenths had margins of less than 19.6%, and
nearly 94% of such proposals had margins of less than 25%. Proposals
regarding the right to act by written consent had margins of 10.6% or less
in more than half of cases, 82% had margins of less than 19.6%, and 86%
had margins of less than 25%. Proposals in these categories are clearly
within the influence of the Big Three. In addition, proposals seeking to
91. Table 13 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor. Id.
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amend proxy access and those seeking shareholder input on bylaw
changes were also frequently within the influence of the Big Three. Onequarter of proposals related to proxy access were within 19.6% margins,
while half were within 25% margins. In addition, one of the two proposals seeking shareholder input on bylaws had margins of less than 19.6%.
The seven proposals in other categories (alternatives to maximize shareholder value, risk oversight committee, reporting on stock buybacks, corporate structure reform, and shareholder input on corporate structure
reform) had margins so wide as to be outside of the Big Three’s range of
influence. Overall, the Big Three have the ability to impact a substantial
portion of proposals related to other governance topics.
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OTHER GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS92

This Table provides data on the mean rate of overall shareholder support for proposals related to other governance topics in calendar years
2018 and 2019, as well as the proportion of shareholder proposals that fell
within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25% (Big
Three).
Mean
Big One Big Two
Support
0 of 2
0 of 2
Alternatives to Maximize
0.6%
(0%)
(0%)
Shareholder Value
12 of 79 41 of 79
Chairperson Independence
30.1%
(15.2%) (51.9%)
1 of 2
1 of 2
Declassify the Board
67.1%
(50%)
(50%)
0 of 2
0 of 2
Risk Oversight Committee
10.2%
(0%)
(0%)
0 of 1
0 of 1
Report on Stock Buybacks
5.6%
(0%)
(0%)
0 of 1
0 of 1
Corporation Structure Reform 13.5%
(0%)
(0%)
0 of 28
7 of 28
Proxy Access Amendments
27.5%
(0%)
(25%)
0 of 2
1 of 2
Shareholder Input on Bylaws 22.6%
(0%)
(50%)
Require Shareholder
0 of 1
0 of 1
7.7%
Approval of Board Size
(0%)
(0%)
Change
Reduce Ownership
28 of 49 44 of 49
Percentage to Call Special
41%
(57.1%) (89.8%)
Meetings
Right to Act by Written
27 of 50 41 of 50
38.6%
Consent
(54%)
(82%)
68 of 217 135 of 217
Overall Other Governance
(31.3%) (62.2%)
Category

Big Three
0 of 2
(0%)
57 of 79
(72.2%)
2 of 2
(100%)
0 of 2
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
0 of 1
(0%)
14 of 28
(50%)
1 of 2
(50%)
0 of 1
(0%)
46 of 49
(93.9%)
43 of 50
(86%)
163 of 217
(75.1%)

An analysis of the margins by which proxy votes are won or lost reveals
that a meaningful number of shareholder proposals are sufficiently controversial so as to be within the influence of the Big Three’s voting power.
This means that just three stewardship teams, and frequently even just
two or one stewardship teams, have the power to affect governance out92. Table 14 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor. Id.
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comes at the largest corporations in the United States. The narrow margins for many governance votes underscore the reality that index funds
are already shaping corporate decision-making and are already determining the outcome of a significant portion of proxy votes.
D. ALL SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
Table 15 reveals that, in all, nearly one-fifth of shareholder proposals
won or lost by margins of less than 10.6%, over four-tenths won or lost by
margins of less than 19.6%, and nearly six-tenths won or lost by margins
of less than 25%. Governance proposals had the narrowest margins,
while social and environmental proposals had slightly wider margins.
TABLE 15: VOTING MARGINS

ON

ALL SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS93

This Table provides data on the proportion of shareholder proposals
that fell within margins of 10.6% (Big One), 19.6% (Big Two), and 25%
(Big Three) in calendar years 2018 and 2019.
Category
Environmental
Social
Governance
All Shareholder Proposals

Big One
9 of 57
(15.8%)
19 of 155
(12.3%)
72 of 299
(24.1%)
100 of 511
(19.6%)

Big Two
20 of 57
(35.1%)
53 of 155
(34.2%)
151 of 299
(50.5%)
224 of 511
(43.8%)

Big Three
28 of 57
(49.1%)
76 of 155
(49.0%)
195 of 299
(65.2%)
299 of 511
(58.5%)

Overall, these findings reveal that a significant proportion of shareholder proposals have relatively thin margins relative to the voting power
of the Big Three. Thus, the Big Three may already be in a position to
determine the outcome of the majority of shareholder proposals. In this
way, the risks associated with concentrating voting power in the hands of
a few stewardship teams is not just a future possibility but a present
reality.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The data in Part III reveal that the Big Three index funds possess significant voting power at America’s largest companies today, not just at
some point in the future. The data in Part IV demonstrate that margins
are close enough on controversial topics to permit the Big Three, or even
the Big Two or the Big One, to determine the outcome of numerous
proxy votes right now, not just in a decade or two. Together, the data
93. Table 15 is based on data on the outcomes of shareholder proposals for the largest
250 U.S. public companies, as ranked by Fortune magazine, collected by Proxy Monitor. Id.
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confirm that the Big Three have already radically transformed the corporate governance arena. While only two decades ago, it was possible to
overlook the Big Three’s voting activities as inconsequential, their voting
activities are now commonly outcome determinative and thus demand
careful scrutiny.
Fiduciary duties obligate index funds to vote shares “in a manner consistent with the best interests” of index fund investors.94 In assessing
whether and to what extent index funds are using their considerable,
often decisive, power in the “best interests” of their investors, two questions are paramount: First, what are those best interests? Second, who is
in the best position to decide?
As to the latter question, the Big Three have made it abundantly clear
through their actions (and inaction) that they believe their own employees are fit to unilaterally decide the “best interests” of investors without
any meaningful input from those investors and without any attempt to
discern those investors’ actual preferences and interests.95 To the extent
that the Big Three’s priorities differ from those of their investors, this
paternalism frustrates the purpose of the best interests standard and the
spirit of their fiduciary obligations.
As to the former question, the Big Three’s voting behaviors speak for
themselves and often in ways that are very likely to conflict with the
views and values of their alleged principals, at least to the extent the index fund populace mirrors the American public at large. For example, in
the environmental realm, the Big Three rarely support environmental
proposals96 despite the fact that 74% of Americans say that “the country
should do whatever it takes to protect the environment.”97 Likewise, 68%
of Americans believe that the government is doing too little to protect
water quality, and 67% of Americans believe that the government is doing too little to protect air quality.98 However, the Big Three very rarely
supported shareholder proposals seeking to address pollution.99
Similar discrepancies can be seen on social topics. Even though 73% of
Americans believe that companies should do more to promote gender
94. Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 2, at 6565.
95. See generally Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the
Index Fund Giants, MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 9–14) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3365222).
96. Griffin, supra note 62, at 24–25.
97. Monica Anderson, For Earth Day, Here’s How Americans View Environmental
Issues, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/20/
for-earth-day-heres-how-americans-view-environmental-issues/ [https://perma.cc/XXP8PKT4].
98. Majorities of Americans Say the Federal Government is Not Doing Enough to Protect the Climate, Environment, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/28/more-americans-see-climate-change-as-a-priority-butdemocrats-are-much-more-concerned-than-republicans/ft_2020-02-28_climatechange_03/
[https://perma.cc/VDV3-UYZE].
99. Griffin, supra note 62, at 24.
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pay equity,100 the Big Three rarely (9.6% of the time for BlackRock and
24% of the time for State Street) or never (for Vanguard) support proposals seeking to address the gender pay gap.101 In a similar vein, the Big
Three very rarely support proposals to promote increased transparency of
corporate lobbying activities,102 even though 59% of Americans believe
that corporate lobbyists have too much power.103 From 2018–2019, none
of the Big Three supported even one shareholder proposal related to data
privacy,104 even though 81% of Americans believe that the risks of companies collecting their data outweigh the benefits and 79% of Americans
are very or somewhat concerned about data privacy.105
The discrepancies between likely investor preferences and actual voting behaviors persist despite the existence of simple, legal, inexpensive,
and efficient methods of increasing the alignment between the two. The
first method is pass-through voting instructions. This mechanism has two
distinct features: (i) “pass through voting” and (ii) “instructions” for
proxy voting. Part (i), pass-through voting, involves viewing the index
fund for what it really is: a conduit for investing in company stock. When
so viewed, it makes little sense to vest proxy voting rights in the conduit
rather than in the actual investors. Rather, under this reform, proxy voting rights would “pass through” the index fund intermediary to the actual
investor. Pass-through voting would help to mitigate the problem of concentrated index fund power by transferring this power from index funds
to their investors. Further, this reform would increase the accountability
of index fund agents and promote alignment between proxy voting outcomes and investor preferences. Instead of utilizing their own judgment
on proxy votes, index fund stewardship teams would be constrained by
index fund investors’ actual, directly expressed preferences.
Part (ii), allowing investors to issue “instructions” on how their investments should be voted, is designed to simplify the voting process and reduce the burden of the overwhelming number of votes index fund
investors would otherwise need to consider. These instructions use a simple “If X, do Y” format, allowing investors to utilize voting guidelines in a
similar fashion as index fund stewardship teams. For instance, an investor
could say “Vote yes on all proposals to disclose carbon emissions,” or
100. Jillesa Gebhardt, On Equal Pay Day 2019, Lack of Awareness Persists,
SURVEYMONKEY (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.surveymonkey.com/curiosity/equal-pay-day2019/ [https://perma.cc/TTB6-KGD5].
101. Griffin, supra note 62, at 18.
102. Id. at 69.
103. Neil Irwin, Americans Are O.K. With Big Business. It’s Business Lobbying Power
They Hate., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/upshot/americans-are-ok-with-big-business-its-business-lobbying-power-they-hate.html [https://
perma.cc/D49Z-X3ZK].
104. Griffin, supra note 62, at 21.
105. Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling
Lack of Control Over Their Personal Information, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://
www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confusedand-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/ [https://perma.cc/M3DW39JD].
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“Vote yes on all proposals to disclose political spending,” and the fund
would vote the investor’s shares that way at each company where the
issue arose. This is essentially how index funds themselves deal with the
overwhelming number of votes they must cast—via generalized voting
guidelines that they apply to similar issues across hundreds of companies.106 If index funds or regulators so choose, it could be investors, rather
than a handful of top index fund employees, setting the voting guidelines
themselves. Additionally, requiring index funds to follow investor-generated guidelines necessarily requires index funds to vote their proxies proportionately rather than as an undifferentiated bloc. By splitting the votes
of the Big Three index funds and removing some of their discretionary
voting power, this proposal would substantially reduce their concentrated
proxy voting influence.
Combining the two subproposals, pass-through voting instructions
would allow investors, rather than stewardship teams, to decide how they
would like to vote on important issues, such as climate change, political
spending, and board diversity, and then require index funds to carry out
investors’ voting instructions until otherwise informed. Because investorgenerated voting instructions could be highly variable, regulators should
propose a limited menu of standardized voting instructions to eliminate
the need for complex, individualized interpretation. In crafting such a
standardized menu, regulators should balance the positive aspects of investor voice and limiting discretionary voting by index fund agents
against the potential costs produced by allowing overly idiosyncratic voting instructions. Ultimately, when compared to the hundreds of
thousands of case-by-case determinations called for with simple passthrough voting of index funds, pass-through voting instructions would
substantially economize voting effort and drastically simplify the proxy
voting process for investors by allowing them to make decisions in an
issue-based manner.
The second method of increasing investor involvement, “proxy choice,”
recognizes that, even when voting is drastically simplified and voting effort is economized, not all investors will desire to vote on all issues. Moreover, some issues may simply be too complex for standardized voting
guidelines and will instead require case-by-case analysis. Thus, the second
proposal suggests that investors should be able to choose who is voting on
their behalf. For example, if an individual were invested in a fund at Vanguard but wanted his or her shares voted to mirror State Street’s, the
investor could tell Vanguard to do so. Likewise, if an investor identified a
proxy advisory firm or asset manager that better mirrored her investment
priorities or values, she would be able to have her shares voted according
to that entities’ voting recommendations. “Proxy choice” would unify the
financial and voting dimensions of index investing by allowing investors
to control both investment decisions (i.e., in which basket of stocks to
106. See Lund, supra note 11, at 516 (describing the use of generic voting guidelines at
index funds to streamline voting decisions).
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invest) and stewardship decisions (i.e., how to vote those stocks)—just as
those who directly invest in stock choose both in which stocks they want
to invest and how to vote those stocks. Proxy choice would thus permit
investors greater discretion in the proxy voting arena because investors
would have the ability to broadly direct how their investments were
voted, and it would increase accountability for voting behaviors because
investors would have a mechanism to reject inferior voting and select superior voting.
A third method of increasing investor involvement would involve the
Big Three index funds and their competitors seeking out greater information about investor preferences, values, and financial interests via a survey or poll. Index funds can relatively cheaply and easily identify their
investors’ preferences on the most salient topics at issue in proxy contests, engagements, and priority-setting efforts simply by asking those investors for their input. For example, index funds could give investors the
option to state a preference for whether corporations should be required
to establish greenhouse gas emissions targets or to express their opinion
on whether firms should make disclosures related to gender pay equity.
Similarly, funds could seek out information about investors’ risk tolerances and timelines for investment, which could help them make decisions on key governance topics. Funds could voluntarily use this
information to ensure that voting behaviors do indeed reflect investors’
interests, or, alternatively, regulators could require that funds do so.
The overall intuition for these three proposals is that the law’s current
decoupling of economic ownership from voting power is a historical accident, and this historical accident is the fundamental problem driving most
other index fund issues. Each of these proposals is premised on the assumption that ownership and voting power should go together to the
greatest extent possible. Given the focus on agency costs—problems created by the separation of ownership and control—that animates so much
of corporate legal scholarship, this assumption should be relatively uncontroversial. It is incumbent upon regulators to require mechanisms
such as the three outlined above that could hold index funds accountable
for accurately reflecting investors’ best interests in their proxy votes,
given the great power already in the hands of index funds. Such a move
would have the additional positive effects of reducing the concentrated
power in the hands of index funds, providing a necessary check on stewardship teams’ voting dominance, diversifying the pool of corporate governance decisionmakers, and restoring the promise of shareholder
democracy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The data presented in this Article reveal that the Big Three already
have substantial power to determine the fate of controversial shareholder
proposals. A considerable portion of proposals are likely won or lost
based upon the Big Three’s support or lack thereof. In many cases, just
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one or two index funds alone may have the power to determine voting
outcomes. As a byproduct of simple mathematics, the Big Three’s collective and individual power is greatest on the most controversial ballot
items—i.e., where voting margins are the narrowest. Thus, the Big
Three’s support is likely to be outcome determinative on precisely those
issues that are most hotly contested.
The Big Three wield this power in ways unlikely to correspond to their
investors’ preferences, values, and interests.107 Their voting decisions are
not based upon any meaningful input from those investors, but upon the
opinions of stewardship teams comprised of index fund employees. The
lack of deference to—or even awareness of—investor preferences was
perhaps excusable when index funds had only a very limited ability to
influence proxy voting outcomes. However, as this Article demonstrates,
index funds are already playing a pivotal role in corporate governance at
America’s largest companies. It is therefore crucial for index funds’
power to be tethered to the actual preferences of their investors.

107. See Griffin, supra note 95 (manuscript at 13).
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